INTRODUCTION
Switzerland is an interesting country to study the dynamics of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) because it offers two paradoxes. Understanding the backgrounds of these paradoxes helps to appreciate the nature of the Swiss corporate governance system, and the direction that this system may take as a result of recent IPO activity. First, Switzerland has recently been ranked as the most competitive country in the world (World Economic Forum, 2010: 14) .
Specifically, its position as second in the world in terms of "innovation and sophistication factors" suggests that Switzerland may be the home of a large number of IPOs. However, over the period 2006-2008, only 16 IPOs were registered in Switzerland that met the IPO definition that is used in this volume.
Second, located in the heart of Europe with a population of 7.6 million people, Switzerland is the home of many leading multinational corporations (MNCs) such as Nestlé, Novartis, Roche, Zurich Financial Services, UBS and Credit Suisse. Indeed, with almost two Fortune Global 500 firms per 1 million Swiss citizens, Switzerland has the highest density of Fortune Global 500 firms in the world. Furthermore, Switzerland has also been the object of largescale foreign direct investments by non-Swiss MNCs keen to relocate headquarter-type activities to Switzerland. However, efforts to raise the attractiveness of Switzerland to foreign institutional investors have been less than successful and foreign investors have thus far played a modest role in the Swiss corporate governance scene.
Similar to countries like Austria, Germany and Japan, Swiss listed companies operate under Germanic civil law. The Swiss governance system is often categorized as belonging to the Continental European model of corporate governance. Indeed, Swiss listed firms have traditionally been characterized by comparatively high rates of ownership concentration.
Today, major block-holders tend to be large corporations and family owners rather than banks. Bank ownership in Swiss listed firms has been significantly reduced during the last few years.
However, the Swiss corporate governance scene differs from other Germanic civil law economies in two key respects. First, Swiss listed firms are free to adopt a board structure that best fits their business requirements, i.e. they can establish either a one-tier or a two-tier board. The only category of Swiss listed firms that have no choice in terms of board structure are banks which are required by law to set up a two-tier board. Second, most corporate governance regulations of the Swiss code are based on the "comply or explain" principle.
However, the Swiss Stock Exchange (SIX) has drafted additional requirements stipulating that all listed firms have to publish specific corporate governance details (such as total executive remuneration, board composition, share ownership and financial performance information) in their annual reports.
In the past, Switzerland has occasionally been criticized for inadequate investor protection standards (World Bank, 2010) , high ownership concentration (OECD, 2006) and a lack of response to international pressures for a more shareholder oriented model of governance (US Commercial Service, 2009) . In response to such criticism, Switzerland has over the years introduced a series of corporate governance reforms aiming to enhance convergence with international governance standards (Schweizer, 2006; Schleiffer and von Planta, 2009; Ruigrok and Canepa, 2005) . For Switzerland, it is essential to adopt governance guidelines that correspond with what are perceived as international best practices and to transform the governance system in a way that is in line with more dispersed ownership, in order to be an attractive investment location for foreign investors.
The importance of attracting institutional investors from both inside and outside the country is particularly crucial for newly listed IPO firms. The risk of investing in IPO firms is higher than it is in large already listed companies, since IPOs are usually young firms that lack of long operating history and publicly available performance information (Certo, 2003) . IPO firms that manage to attract foreign investors may broaden their investment base and have a higher likelihood to attract specialized investors that understand the IPO firm's business.
-3-Thus, adopting efficient corporate governance principles that meet foreign investors' preferences and promote ownership dispersion is crucial for (Swiss) IPO success. (Economiesuisse, 2007 (IMF, 2007: 13) . As a quick response to that, the Swiss Business Federation (Economiesuisse) introduced some further reforms to the Swiss code during the same year. Changes mainly referred to the remuneration of directors and senior managers, the reinforcement of shareholder rights, as well as other internal control issues (Economiesuisse, 2007) . To shed more detailed light on the Swiss governance system, the following paragraphs present the major characteristics of the "Swiss code of best practice" with regards to the rights of shareholders, the responsibilities and composition of the board of directors based on the most recent reforms introduced in 2007.
Shareholder rights:
The most important process of corporate governance is the general shareholders' meeting which is compulsory for all listed companies at least once a year.
During the meeting, shareholders can make suggestions on the items given in the meeting's agenda and ask the board of directors to provide detailed information concerning company matters. Shareholders can make decisions regarding personnel issues at the top level of the organization, such as appointing auditors and electing new board members (Economiesuisse, 2007) . To put an additional subject on the meeting's agenda, a shareholder must own shares with a nominal value of at least 1.06 million 1 (USD) (CO, art. 699). Furthermore, shareholders with more than 10 percent of registered shares have the right to call for additional general meetings (CO, art. 699). Such shareholder powers have led some scholars to characterize the Swiss system as the most shareholder oriented system of the "European continental governance block" (Pedrazzini, 1998) . However, other studies argue that further reforms with regards to the protection of minority shareholders are required in order to enhance convergence with the international governance standards (Mach et al., 2007) .
Board structure and composition: According to the Swiss code of best practice, listed firms are required to have a board of directors responsible for the executive control and management of the organization. All firms, apart from banks, have the flexibility to structure their boards based on their business requirements. There are three board structures that Swiss listed firms can have: a) the unitary board structure (the board of directors has the responsibility for both control and management of the organization) b) the dual board structure (two-tier boards) and c) the mixed board structure (boards that consist of both executive and non-executive members). Banks, however, must consist of two-tier boards; the supervisory board that is responsible for monitoring executive behaviors and actions, and the executive board responsible for the adequate management of the organization (Economiesuisse, 2007) .
In case of a mixed board structure, the Swiss Code recommends that the majority of board members should be non-executive independent directors. In Switzerland, the definition of directors' independence differs from most countries. According to the Swiss code, directors are characterized as independent if they have no personal and/or professional relationship with the focal firm for three years before their appointment. This differs from the more widely (Economiesuisse, 2007) . No gender quota stipulations exist, despite the even by international standards very low female board participation ratio (Ruigrok, et al., 2007) .
Board responsibilities and committees:
The Swiss Code implies that the main responsibilities of boards of directors in Swiss listed firms are: a) defining the strategic goals and the means to achieve them, b) supervising and monitoring the executive management, c) preparing the annual report as well as the agenda of the general shareholders' meeting, d) appointing and/or removing executive members and e) actively representing the company inside and outside the organizational context (CO art. 716a). To fulfill these responsibilities effectively, boards should meet at least four times a year in order to discuss important company matters and to evaluate the performance of executive members. Additionally, the compensation of all members of the supervisory and executive board, as well as the characteristics of shareholders with more than 5 percent of shares should be reported in the firm's annual report. Finally, the Swiss Code recommends that boards of directors should set up audit, nomination and compensation committees. These committees should consist of a majority of independent directors who have a relationship of no more than three years with the company and who have no family ties with any member of the executive management (Economiesuisse, 2007) .
Swiss exchange and ownership concentration
The Swiss exchange ( (Hu, 2009; Ruigrok, et al., 2006; Keller, 2003) . In 2003 Switzerland had the second highest ownership concentration rate among nine Western European countries (Table 1) . Specifically, 47 percent of Swiss listed firms had one block-holder possessing more than 50 percent of shares (OECD, 2006) . This high ownership concentration undermines the attractiveness for foreign (institutional) investors to invest in Swiss companies. However, efforts have been made to increase transparency about ownership dispersion rates. Based on the 2007 corporate governance reform, Swiss listed firms must report the shareholders who hold more than 5 percent of shares in their annual reports (Economiesuisse, 2007) .
IPO ACTIVITY IN SWITZERLAND (2006-2008)
The IPO process in Switzerland
At the very beginning of the IPO process, the issuer should find a ''recognized sponsor'' (i.e. listing agent) that will act as representative of the IPO firm. Once the listing agent has been identified, the next step of the IPO is to fix the offering price which is determined by "book- To receive the final listing-admission, IPO firms need to fulfill specific standards depending on the segment in which they intend to be listed. As Table 2 shows, there are two alternative segments; the first (i.e. main standard) refers to firms that want to have access to foreign markets and satisfy the needs of foreign institutional investors, while the second segment (i.e. a new issue of a common stock (not a new issue of a debt instrument), 2) a firm that was not listed in any other stock exchange before its public offering at SIX. From the total number of 28 newly listed firms indicated at SIX website, the study excluded those that did not fulfill the above criteria. In addition, all firms that went public after spin-off activities were kept out of the sample since such firms cannot be regarded as ''truly new'' public offerings (Carpenter et al., 2003) . This resulted in a final sample of sixteen Swiss IPOs (Table 3) (Table 3 ). This shows that newly listed companies generally tend to follow the recommendations of the Swiss code of best practice with regards to the establishment of board committees. Furthermore, 40 percent of Swiss IPOs adopted a dual leadership structure and, with just one exception, all Swiss IPOs managed to attract foreign investors 3 .
The majority of IPO firms experienced a reduction in their share price one year after their initial public offering (Table 3) million (USD) total assets at the time of their initial public offering (Table 4 ). The smallest firm in the Swiss IPO sample in terms of number of employees and total assets is SAF, while the largest one is Petroplus, an Oil & Gas company with 7.8 billion (USD) revenues and 3.5 billion (USD) total assets. Petroplus has assets and revenues that are far higher even than the second largest Swiss IPO in this period, and raises the IPO averages illustrated in Table 4 . In addition, firm performance one year prior to the offering for all IPOs was relatively high with an average ROA of 0.13 and an average ROE of 0.25. Only three IPOs in the sample show negative profitability prior the offering with lowest ROA being -0.54 and lowest ROE being -0.71.
As noted earlier, another feature of the Swiss governance system is the high concentration of ownership in the hands of block-holders. Recent corporate governance reforms have attempted to reduce ownership concentration and to encourage more dispersed ownership structures based on the Anglo-Saxon standards. An interesting point in the Swiss IPO sample is that ownership concentration of the Top-1 shareholder is significantly reduced from the year prior to the offering to the year after the offering. More specifically, in eleven IPOs the Top-1 shareholder owned less than 25 percent of firm's share capital (Table 5 ). On the other shareholders owned between 25 percent and 50 percent of total shares after the first day of trading. Although this shows a slight improvement compared with ownership concentration in Table 1 , further efforts to reduce the ownership concentration in Switzerland are required in order to reach the Anglo-Saxon standards. Additionally, venture capital firms and entrepreneurial families own less than 25 percent of shares after the IPO.
Board composition in Swiss IPOs
As shown in Table 6 , boards of directors in Swiss IPOs have on average seven members; the smallest board consists of four members while the largest one consists of ten members. The majority of directors are non-executives (63 percent) with a minimum proportion of 20 percent and a maximum of 100 percent (companies with boards consisting of only nonexecutive directors have adopted two-tier board structures 4 ). Furthermore, in line with Swiss corporate governance patterns, female directors are relatively few (average female participation is 5 percent), while the average age of board members is 52 years old. Another interesting characteristic of Swiss IPO boards is the educational qualification level of directors. As Table 6 shows, the average proportion of directors with a PhD degree is high (27 percent), while many others hold at least an MBA or Master of Science (MSc) degree (13 4 A two-tier board of directors in the Swiss context is more comparable to a board of directors in the AngloAmerican context than a supervisory board in the German context. In Switzerland the term "supervisory board" is not typically used but rather considered as a German institution. The executive board is considered as the top management team. percent and 26 percent respectively). The educational level of directors has been characterized as a signal of firm's reputation (Certo, 2003) and, faced with uncertainty Swiss IPOs, appear to communicate the competence level of the people involved in the company to potential investors.
Demographic Diversity in Swiss IPO Boards and TMTs
Researchers have argued that diversity in the boardroom brings more information processing abilities (Richard and Shelor, 2002 ) and higher quality of executive monitoring (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003) . Investors may consider board and TMT diversity as a positive signal for IPOs' likelihood of success (Certo, 2003) . Nationality and educational level diversity was measured using Blau's (1977) index, calculated as 1 -Σpi 2 , where p represents the proportion of board members in the i th nationality/educational category (Elron, 1997; Harrison and Klein, 2007; Tihanyi, et al., 2000) . Since age is an interval variable, age diversity was calculated by dividing the standard deviation by the mean of age for each board and TMT (Tihanyi et al., 2000; Zimmerman, 2008) . High scores indicate high age, educational level and nationality diversity.
As mentioned earlier, the Swiss code recommends that boards of directors and management teams of Swiss companies listed under the main standards should consist of members who have extended international experiences and/or who are foreign nationals. As Table 7 illustrates, the average nationality diversity in Swiss IPOs is relatively high with a mean score of 0.41 diversity index. This indicates that newly listed firms tend to follow this recommendation. Moreover, educational level diversity of IPO boards is also high with an 
Description of a Swiss IPO: Burkhalter Group
The M&A activities within the country. As Burkhalter's CEO, Marco Syfrig claimed: ''By continuing our acquisition strategy and constantly strengthening our risk management procedures we will be able to more than compensate for any organic sales decline at Group level' ' (Burkhalter, Annual Report, 2008) .
CONCLUSION
The aim of this study was to describe the current state of corporate governance in Switzerland and to consider whether newly listed firms tend to comply with the recent corporate 
